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THE APPLICATION OF A LOCAL OR NATIONAL STANDARD OF DECENCY
IN THE USE OF THE ROTH-MEMOIRS OBSCENITY TEST
Scuncio v. Columbus Theatre, Inc., 277 A.2d 924 (R.I. 1971)
The members of the Providence Bureau of Licenses instituted an ac-
tion in a superior court, petitioning the court to declare the movie
"Without a Stitch" obscene and to issue a permanent injunction enjoin-
ing the defendants from showing the film. In a proceeding prescribed by
Rhode Island Statute,1 the prayer was granted. On appeal, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held: the standard of decency by which the film
is to be characterized should be a national standard rather than the
Rhode Island standard used by the trial court. The upper court also
found that it could not make any definite finding that the film affronted
such a national standard since the Bureau, which had the burden of
proving obscenity, had failed to present evidence on that issue.
The case is a product of Roth v. United States, which established a
three part test for determining if the material in question is obscene.
First, the dominant theme of the work, taken as a whole, must appeal
to prurient interests in sex; secondly, the material must be patently of-
fensive and affront contemporary community standards relating to the
description and representation of sexual matters; thirdly, the material
must be utterly without any redeeming social value. 2 On superficial
examination, the second part of the test, the question of an affront to
contemporary community standards, would appear capable of applica-
tion with few complications. Just what "contemporary community
standards" means, however, has provoked considerable uncertainty.
In Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day3 Justice Harlan first suggested
that a national standard should be applied in determining community
standards. The first major attempt by the Supreme Court at clarification
of this standard appeared seven years after Roth in Jacobellis v. Ohio.4
Justice Brennan stated in his opinion for the court that a national stan-
dard was to apply since, "It is, after all, a national Constitution we are
expounding." ' 5 Even if the lower court properly applies the national
1. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 5-22-5 (1956), as amended Pub. L. 1966, ch. 260, 1. The amended
statute empowers the Bureau of Licenses to institute court action to enjoin the showing of the film
within forty-eight hours of the application for a permit to publicly present the film.
2. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3. 370 U.S. 478 (1961).
4. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
5. Id. at 195.
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standard, however, Justice Brennan indicated the possibility of Supreme
Court review:
Since it is only "obscenity" that is excluded from the constitutional
protection, the question whether a particular work is obscene necessarily
implicates an issue of constitutional law. Such an issue, we think, must
ultimately be decided by this Court.6
The practicality of applying the opinion's guidelines were immediately
questioned. In his dissent in Jacobellis, Chief Justice Warren insisted
that it was unlikely that a local justice or jury could divine a national
standard of decency when the Supreme Court had been unable to articu-
late one. He also argued that the Court should review only to see if there
was sufficient evidence for the findings of the lower court; otherwise, the
Supreme Court would become a Super Censor. 7 Commentators have
also questioned the efficacy of the national standards test.8
Even more basic than the controversy over the practicality of a na-
tional standards test is the uncertainty over whether such a national
guideline need be applied at all.9 The alignment of the Court in Jacobellis
in part gave rise to the continuing debate. Only two Justices aligned with
the theory of national standards and only two more agreed to an inde-
pendent review by the Court. The rest of the majority concurred on other
grounds. 0 The lack of unanimity led one federal judge to declare, "The
question of national versus community or other standards has not yet
been determined. . . ."I' Although written in 1967, this declaration
accurately reflects the law today as evidenced by the diversity of the
opinions. Some federal jurisdictions have applied a national standard of
6. Id. at 188.
7. Id. at 203.
8. See O'Meara and Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court: A Note on Jacobellis v. Ohio,
40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 8-9 (1964):
The jury could not and would not reflect a national standard, because such a standard is a
fiction pure and simple. . . .[I]n short, the only viable standard is the standard of the jury,
for, in our jurisprudential system, the jury is the community.
9. An amicus brief cited in Meyer'v. Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457, 465 n. Il (M.D. Fla. 1970),
asserted that six federal courts of appeal and four states have followed a national standard, three
states have adopted a statewide standard, five states have retained a local community standard, and
four states are confused as to what standard controls.
10. Only four justices approached the question of national standards, two of them supporting
the concept and two attacking it. Justice Harlan indicated a willingness to apply national standards
to a federal law, but not to a state law proscribing obscenity. See Seaton, Obscenity: The Search
for a Standard, 13 KAN. L. REV. 117 (1964).
11. Reed Enterprises, Inc. v. Clark, 278 F. Supp. 372, 383 (D.D.C. 1967).
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decency,'2 while at least one federal district court has found as acceptable
a standard that is "not less than statewide."' 13 The lack of uniformity is
evident among the state courts to an even greater degree.1"
In Scuncio, the finding that the use of a Rhode Island standard of
decency was error is an affirmation of the intention of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court to apply a national standard, a decision clearly stated
by the opinion in In re Seven Magazines.'5 However, the use of a na-
tional standard creates two major problems, one of which confronted the
court in the principal case.
First, the need to determine the defendants' rights as soon as possible
may preclude the use of a jury in the Scuncio situation, but some jurists
believe that the use of a national standard with independent review by
the judiciary minimizes the utility of juries in obscenity cases in general.
Judge Friendly has concluded that, "Placing the decisional task upon
the judges is a rational consequence of the emphasis on a national stan-
dard of decency."'" The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
12. See United States v. "Language of Love," 432 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. "I
Am Curious-Yellow," 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968); Haldeman v. United States, 340 F.2d 59 (10th
Cir. 1965); Excellent Publications, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 362 (Ist Cir. 1962); Meyer v.
Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Fla. 1970); United States v. One Carton of Positive Motion Picture
Film, 247 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), rev'd 367 F.2d 889 (1966).
13. Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969), vacated for improper jurisdiction,
401 U.S. 200 (1971). The same court held in Newman v. Connover, 313 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Tex.
1970), that a statewide standard of decency in applying a Texas obscenity statute was a sufficient
constitutional standard.
14. Some courts holding that a national standard controls: State v. Locks, 97 Ariz. 148, 397
P.2d 949 (1964); State v. Vollmar, 389 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1965); State v. Hudson County News Co.,
41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963); In re Seven Magazines, 268 A.2d 707 (R.I. 1970), State v.
Burgin, 178 S.E.2d 325 (S.C. 1970). State courts that have applied or attempted to apply less than
national standards: Gent v. State, 239 Ark. 474, 393 S.W.2d 219 (1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 767 (1967);
In re Gianinni, 69 Cal.2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910
(1969); Felton v. Pensacola, 200 So. 2d 842 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); State v. Henry, 250 La. 682, 198
So. 2d 889, 895 (1965), rev'd, 392 U.S. 655 (1968); People v. Bloss, 27 Mich. App. 687, 184 N.W.2d
299 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970), rev'd 402 U.S. 938 (1971); Court v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 683, 188 N.W.2d
475 (1971).
15. 268 A.2d 707 (R.I. 1970).
16. United States v. "I am Curious-Yellow," 404 F.2d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1968)(concurring
opinion). For a discussion of the logical nexus between the independent review concept and the
national standards test, see Seaton, Obscenity: The Search for a Standard, supra note 10, at 122:
The use of a "local" standard by a judge or jury in Kansas or New York, assuming one to
be ascertainable, would eliminate meaningful review by the Supreme Court. The Justices in
Washington lack the experience of Kansas or New York standards which local judges and
juries would presumably possess.
For warnings that the national standard will render the jury of little value in obscenity cases, see
O'Meara and Shaffer, supra note 8.
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lent added weight to that opinion by its holding that in obscenity cases
the jury can have no more than an advisory role."7
Secondly, the use of the Roth test with the Jacobellis elaboration
seems to necessitate the admission of expert testimony, a conclusion
reached by Justice Frankfurter: "Community standards . . . can as a
matter of fact hardly be established except through experts .. 18 It
is on this issue that the Scuncio case was decided, since the Bureau had
failed to present any evidence of obscenity. Although the Rhode Island
court has held that the allegedly offending work alone is insufficient evi-
dence of obscenity,"0 there are few guidelines which the prosecution can
follow in ascertaining what evidence to present. Indeed, the Scunico
court points to the impossibility of legislatively defining obscenity be-
cause ofthe absence of definite Supreme Court guidelines."0
Significantly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which seized on the lack
of a true majority in Jacobellis to reject the national standard, has
recently upheld obscenity convictions while affirming the use of state
standards of decency and juries in such cases. 2' Moreover, the Wisconsin
court held that no expert testimony was necessary to enable the jury to
make a finding of obscenity.22 A state that adopts a local standard of
decency can argue further that a jury accurately reflects this standard.
Since the jurors' attitudes as expressed in the jury findings are assumed
17. United States v. "Language of Love," 432 F.2d 705, 711 (2d Cir. 1970).
18. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 165 (1959). Similar sentiments are expressed in: United
States v. Kaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965); Dunn v. State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 249, 213 A.2d
751 (1965); Duggan v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 436 Pa. 191, 258 A.2d 858, 863 (1969); House v.
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 121, 169 S.E.2d 572 (1969); State v. Kois, 51 Wis. 2d 668, 188 N.W.2d
467 (1971).
19. In re Seven Magazines, supra note 15.
20. Scuncio v. Columbus Theatre, Inc., 277 A.2d 924, 927 (R.I. 1971).
21. Court v. State 51 Wis. 2d 683, 188 N.W. 2d 475, 480 (1971):
This court . . . has declined to approve the standards of a national community as has been
suggested in Jacobellis, supra. In State v. Kois, 51 Wis. 2d 668, 188 N.W.2d 467, of even
date herewith we have again stated, "[W]e use the contemporary community standards
prevalent in the state of Wisconsin," and express our doubts that there is an ascertainable
national standard.
22. State v. Kois, supra note 18, at 470:
Obscenity is not such an elusive concept that it takes expert witnesses to tell a jury or judge
what is the dominant theme of the material, what is the community standard, or what is
the social value, or that a trial judge or an appellate court cannot find it as a matter of law
or under the Roth-Memoirs test.
See also Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 448 (1957)(Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. "I Am Curious-Yellow," 404 F.2d 196, 203, 204 (2d Cir. 1968)(Lumbard, C.J., dissent-
ing). For a general discussion of the problem, see Note, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation,
1965 Wis. L. Rav. 113.
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to be the very manifestation of the local standard, no experts are needed
to enlighten them on the matter. Such is not the case when a court
accepts the national standard. Since the jurors' attitudes are presumably
based on local experiences, they must be "taught" the elusive national
standard of decency through expert testimony. The jurors are to employ
this newly-gained national consciousness in deciding whether the materi-
als are obscene by the Roth test.2 But even when experts are produced,
prosecutors are often unable to define a precise national standard which
the jury could find has been affronted. On the other hand, the defense
can often raise a presumption that a national standard has not been
affronted by showing that the material in question has been received
favorably in other parts of the nation, or even merely received without
governmental prosecution.
If a national standard of decency is to be used in determining obscen-
ity, manageable guidelines must be established for the application of this
standard. The Rhode Island court in Scunico concludes only that the
national standard is the applicable test. It does nothing to eliminate the
confusion surrounding the application of the standard.
24
23. While applying a national standard of decency in State v. Childs, 252 Ore. 91,447 P.2d 304
(1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 931 (1969), the Oregon Supreme Court advanced the interesting
theory that no expert testimony on national standards was necessary since the average juror is
constantly in touch with the national scene, exposed to national publications, movies, television and
radio.
24. Possibly the Rhode Island dilemma and the Roth test itself may be rendered moot by gradual
changes in the Supreme Court's obscenity doctrines. See Luros v. United States, 389 F.2d 200,
205-06 (8th Cir. 1968):
In Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 18 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1967), there is
specific indication that a majority of the Supreme Court adopts standards not dissimilar to
banning only "hard-core" pornography. Subsequent application of Redrup gives no contra-
indication.
A similar observation is made in Haldeman v. United States, 340 F.2d 59, 62 (10th Cir. 1965).
Vol. 1971: 691]
Washington University Open Scholarship
